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IS THE LAW MALE?: LET ME COUNT THE WAYS*
LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN**
When the American Bar Association Commission on Women in
the Profession joined with Chicago-Kent Law School to initiate the
"Is the Law Male?" continuing legal education programs that pro-
duced this Symposium, we had three goals in mind. First, to introduce
the wider legal community to the path-breaking feminist theorists
working in legal academia. Second, to encourage the use of feminist
legal theory in legal practice by demonstrating how some lawyers are
already using this approach in their own cases. And third, to make the
legal community aware of the extensive range of substantive and pro-
cedural issues which have gender implications and to which feminist
legal theory can be applied. It is on that third goal that this Essay
elaborates.
My own vantage point, since 1981, has been as Director of the
National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women
and Men in the Courts (NJEP): a project conceived and supported by
the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, with the National As-
sociation of Women Judges as co-sponsor. NJEP was established in
1980 for the purpose of introducing information and materials about
the myriad ways gender bias effects judicial decision making and
courtroom interaction into the national, state, and federal continuing
education programs for judges.1 A particular concern of NJEP's has
been to move beyond specialized courses focused on gender issues
and to have these issues integrated throughout the judicial education
curriculum wherever they are relevant.
NJEP's approach was to define gender bias as having three com-
ponents: (1) stereotypical thinking about the nature and roles of wo-
* © Lynn Hecht Schafran 1994.
Director, National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and
Men in the Courts, a project of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in cooperation
with the National Association of Women Judges, and Advisor to the American Bar Association
Commission on Women in the Profession. B.A. Smith College, 1962; M.A. Columbia University,
1965; J.D. Columbia University School of Law, 1974.
1. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating the Judiciary About Gender Bias: The National Judicial
Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts and the New Jersey
Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN'S RrS. L. REP. 109 (1986); Norma
J. Wikler, Water on Stone: A Perspective on the Movement to Eliminate Gender Bias in the Courts,
COURT REV., Fall 1989 at 6, 9.
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men and men; (2) how society values women and men, including what
is perceived as women's work; and (3) myths and misconceptions
about the social and economic realities of women's and men's lives.
NJEP attempted to demonstrate to the judiciary, in highly concrete
terms, how each of these components was manifested in the courts;
how it undermined the fair administration of justice; and the steps
judges could take to ensure that decision making, procedures, and in-
teractions in the courts are not tainted by this kind of bias in the
future.
For example, NJEP's pilot course, presented at the California
Center for Judicial Education and Research in 1981, included a one-
hour segment on sex stereotypes and gender-biased attitudes toward
women in judicial decision making and in statutes themselves, using
rape as an example; a half hour on the dynamics of court interaction;
and a two-hour segment on support awards and enforcement. 2 In the
rape segment, judges had an opportunity to make decisions about
rape evidence hypotheticals under California's then-new rape shield
law and to explore the myths about rape that make these special rules
of evidence necessary. In the court interaction segment, judges were
asked what they would do about a role-played incident in which a
male attorney denigrated and interrupted two women attorneys
before the judge. They were then asked to role-play being the presid-
ing judge of the court and receiving from the Women Lawyers Associ-
ation a letter of complaint about a particular judge who repeatedly
demeaned women attorneys.
During the support awards and enforcement segment, Professor
Carol Bruch of the University of California-Davis Law School and Dr.
Lenore Weitzman presented detailed information about alimony,
child support, and property distribution nationally and in California,
including the study that became Dr. Weitzman's well-known book,
The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Conse-
quences for Women and Children in America. The judges first deter-
mined what, if any, spousal and child support awards they would make
in a hypothetical case, and then explored how these awards would be
eroded by inflation, the kinds of jobs a long-term homemaker wife
could obtain, the costs of child raising and child care in California, and
the much lower post-divorce standards of living of ex-wives compared
2. The National Judicial Education Program's pilot course titled "Judicial Discretion: Does
Sex Make a Difference?" was developed by NJEP's founding director, Dr. Norma J. Wikler.
The Instructor's Manual and Participant's Binder for this course may be purchased from NJEP,
99 Hudson Street, 12th floor, New York, N.Y. 10013; (212) 925-6635.
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to ex-husbands as a result of inadequate and unenforced spousal and
child support.
During the 1970s, when the NOW Legal and Education Fund was
developing the concept for what became the National Judicial Educa-
tion Program, and during the first years of NJEP's work in the early
1980s, the terms "feminist legal theory" and "feminist jurisprudence"
were not yet in use. When the first references to this new analytical
approach to the law emerged in conferences and articles in the mid-
eighties,3 my response was like that of Moliere's bourgeois gen-
tilhomme who discovered that he had been speaking prose for forty
years without knowing it;4 NJEP had been speaking feminist legal the-
ory. The aspect of feminist legal theory that makes it of such interest
to NJEP is its concern with having an impact on the real world. In the
words of Harvard Law Professor Martha Minow, feminist jurispru-
dence "pursues [a] perpetual critique ... while also searching ... for
practical justice, not just more theory."'5 Additionally, like NJEP,
although feminist jurisprudence began with a focus on so-called "wo-
men's issues" such as support awards and rape, it has branched out to
ask what all law and legal process would look like if they embodied a
less abstract, more caring ethic; an inclusive world view; and if theory
were derived from the reality of all women's and men's lives rather
than imposed on it.6
3. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, "Developing Feminist Jurisprudence," Panel Discus-
sion at the 14th National Conference on Women and Law in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 9, 1983);
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence: An Agenda for Research, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 521
(1987); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373
(1986).
4. J.B. MOLIERE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, Act II, (1670).
5. Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 48
(1988).
6. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988).
Note that although the "Is the Law Male?" programs focus on substantive law and proce-
dure, feminist legal theory also criticizes the organization of legal practice as male in its assump-
tion that practitioners have no interest or obligations outside work, no children or elderly
relatives to care for, and a wife at home to handle all domestic matters and keep the family's
emotional motor running. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Lawyers' Lives, Clients' Lives: Can
Women Liberate the Profession? 34 VILL. L. REV. 1105 (1989); Symposium on Women in the
Lawyering Workplace: Feminist Considerations and Practical Solutions, 35 N.Y.L. Sd. L. REV.
293 (1990). For an approach to a more humane style of practice see Memorandum from the
ABA Commission on Women in the Profession, Lawyers and Balanced Lives: A Guide to Draft-
ing and Implementing Workplace Policies for Lawyers (1990) (including discussions of and sam-
ple policies for parental leave and alternative work schedules) (on file with the Commission at
750 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 988-5688).
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"Is THE LAW MALE?"
The question "Is the Law Male?" will be understood by some
readers on sight, puzzled over by others as a conundrum, and dis-
missed by still others as a joke. One way to understand its import is
by analogy to how women are treated by the medical profession.
The public has recently become aware of a set of issues that wo-
men's health advocates have been discussing for years: the male body
as the standard for medical training, research, and treatment. The
"maleness" of medicine has been manifested in the use of the male-
disease model as the norm in medical schools and in the standard defi-
nitions of illnesses, in the exclusion of women from clinical drug trials,
and in Congress's failure to fund research into women's health
problems while putting major money into the illnesses that beset men.
Adherence to the male model in medical schools has meant that phy-
sicians are not taught that breast and pelvic exams are part of a com-
plete physical; not taught that illnesses such as ulcers, heart disease,
lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and gallbladder disease affect women and
men differently; and not taught to appreciate the psychological impact
on women of radical mastectomy and hysterectomy. What medical
students have learned is that it is acceptable to tell women to cut off
their breasts and cut out their uteri as soon as they are finished having
babies.
7
The use of the male-disease model in defining illness has had
acute repercussions for female victims of AIDS.8 Female AIDS vic-
tims rarely get Karposi's Sarcoma, an AIDS-related cancer frequently
seen in male AIDS victims. But they do get cervical cancer,
candidiasis, and pelvic inflammatory disease. Because physicians
were locked into the male model of what AIDS looked like, they
failed to diagnose and properly treat many female AIDS victims. The
male model of AIDS was also the standard definition used by the So-
cial Security Administration to award disability payments, locking fe-
male victims out of the payments they desperately needed to support
themselves and their families.
Women's exclusion from drug trials has made men's response to
new drugs the standard, with the result that doctors have no knowl-
edge of how women's different physiology and hormones are actually
7. Isadore Rosenfeld, Health Care for Women: Taking Affirmative Action, VOGUE, Feb.
1993, at 134.
8. Philip J. Hilts, AIDS Definition Excludes Women, Congress Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1991, at A19.
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affected by these medicines. 9 For example, the fact that women ab-
sorb antidepressants and tranquilizers at a different rate than men has
implications for dosages. In one case, an antidepressant approved
without being tested on women caused more seizures in women than
in men because of the difference in absorption patterns.
With respect to medical research, a study demonstrating the effi-
cacy of aspirin in reducing heart attacks included 22,071 men and no
women. Physicians reading the results of this study had no way of
knowing whether women, too, should take aspirin on a preventative
basis. One study that determined that heavy caffeine ingestion from
coffee drinking did not increase the risk of heart disease and strokes
had 45,589 subjects, all male.10 Women reading of this study were not
told that the unique risks to women from caffeine, such as fibrous
cysts of the breast, were not studied, and that the findings about men
should not be generalized to women." As to why the overwhelmingly
male Congress funded research into heart disease in men while ignor-
ing women's diseases such as osteoporosis and breast cancer,12 Repre-
sentative Patricia Schroeder observed that "[y]ou fund what you
fear."13
Similarly in the law, men's life experience and perspective have
been treated as the norm. For example, rape laws are a codification of
men's fears of false accusations. Fortunately, for more than a decade,
a growing number of women in the law and some of our male col-
leagues have been "asking the woman question," as Duke University
Law Professor Katharine Bartlett puts it, "designed to identify the
gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise ap-
pear to be neutral or objective."' 4 The "maleness" of law is expressed
in many different ways-among them laws and regulations; the cases
that lawyers take or refuse; what is taught in law schools; and how
judges, juries, and other decision makers interpret, apply, and enforce
the laws-and in many more areas of the law than is usually realized.
9. Philip J. Hilts, F.D.A. Ends Ban on Women in Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993,
at B8; Reuters, Heart Research Gaps Are Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at C14.
10. Katrine Ames, Our Bodies, Their Selves, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1990, at 60.
11. Letter to Editor from Congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar, Caffeine Health Study Ex-
cluded Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1990, at A24.
12. It should be noted that heart disease is the biggest killer of women and that men also
get breast cancer. However, the widely held belief that women do not have heart attacks has
meant that women have been ignored in the research, and that treatment for female victims of
heart disease has been too little and too late. Grace Lichtenstein, Crimes of the Heart,
MIRABELLA, Sept. 1992, at 154.
13. Karen Tumulty, Women in Congress Issue Ultimatum on Abortion, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1993, at A5, A8.




Until recently the law was literally man-made, there being no fe-
male legislators, lawyers, or judges, and the consequences for women
were not pretty. Women were denied the right to vote, own property,
enter into contract, sue in their own names, serve on juries, have cus-
tody of their children, or engage in many different types of employ-
ment. During the confirmation hearings for U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the review of the Supreme Court cases
that established her as a pioneer litigator for women's legal rights re-
minded us that less than twenty-five years ago Idaho had a law auto-
matically preferring men to women when equally entitled petitioners
sought to become estate executors, 15 and the Social Security Act pro-
vided less protection to the survivors of working women than to those
of working men.1
6
Apart from the rape laws noted above and discussed elsewhere in
this Symposium, 17 state and federal laws have been largely purged of
their overt anti-woman content. But there are still instances in which
"rules and practices which ... appear to be neutral"'18 are not. Immi-
gration laws and policies are a paradigm example in their repeated
failure to comprehend and allow for the role of domestic violence,
rape, and poverty in women's lives.
The Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986,19 directed at couples
married for less than two years, effectively barred battered women
who were conditional residents from leaving the abusive relationship.
It took four years, but in 1990 feminist lawyers and legislators suc-
ceeded in adding a waiver provision to the law to enable these women
to obtain residency status without a filing by the husbands who were
holding them hostage by refusing to file the requisite joint petition to
remove conditional status. 20
Then, in 1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued
an interim rule eviscerating the waiver for victims of "extreme cru-
15. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
16. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
17. Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHi-KENT L.REv. 359
(1993). Rape laws continue to express a supremely male view of the world in their premise,
absurd to women but a wishful truth for men, that every woman is willing to have sex with any
man any time. It is no accident that it was during Indira Gandhi's tenure as prime minister that
India switched the burden of proof in rape cases to require men to prove consent. Letter to the
Editor from Rafiq Zakaria, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 1993, at A14.
18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986).
20. 8 CFR § 216.5 (1991).
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elty" such as kidnapping or threats who had not experienced physical
violence. The INS required these victims to submit the affidavit of a
licensed clinical social worker, psychologist, or psychiatrist attesting to
the abuse. Feminist lawyers pointed out that rarely can abused immi-
grant women locate mental health professionals or afford their
services.
21
Feminist legal advocates are still seeking to remedy this inequity,
and also provide help to abused women in marriages of more than two
years' duration who do not have conditionai residency. Under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act 22 the petition for residency for the alien
spouse must be filed by the permanent resident or citizen spouse. The
battered alien wife fears that reporting her husband to the police will
lead to her deportation, and the husband holds her hostage by refus-
ing to petition for her residency. The House version of the pending
Violence Against Women Act would cure this by providing for self-
petitioning by the alien spouse.
23
Today, women gang raped in Haiti and El Salvador because of
male family members' political activity are beginning to seek asylum
in the United States. 24 Knowing how extremely reluctant American
women are to report rape to our own authorities, 25 and the torment
experienced by the few immigrant women who have told-or been
too ashamed to tell-their stories of rape to U.S. judges, 26 it is painful
to learn that the Clinton Administration has proposed a plan for expe-
diting the exclusion of asylum seekers at ports of entry that takes no
account of these kinds of cases. As Hope Frye, president of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association says, "It's just not possi-
ble for a woman to tell a stranger in uniform at a foreign airport the
21. Martha F. Davis & Janet M. Calvo, INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection for Abused
Spouses and Children, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES, June 3, 1991, at 665.
22. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a).
23. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
24. Deborah Sontag, Asking for Asylum in U.S., Women Tread New Territory, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1993, at Al, A13.
25. Victim studies disclose extremely low rates of rape reporting. Findings range from a
high of 16% (NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER & CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT
CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 6 (1992)) to a low of only 7% (MAJOR-
ITY STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., IST SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: THE INCREASE OF RAPE IN AMERICA 1990, at 7 (Comm. Print 1991)).
Rape victims are reluctant to report because they fear retaliation, disbelief, the loss of pri-
vacy and the criminal justice system. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A
Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 1013-17 (1993).
26. Sontag, supra note 24, at A13.
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grisly details of how she was gang-raped by people in uniform in her
own country.
'27
SHOULD I TAKE HER CASE?
A threshold issue for civil plaintiffs and crime victims is getting
into court, which usually requires getting a lawyer to believe in your
case. A lawyer who does not realize what he or she 28 does not know
about the social and economic realities of women's lives, and who
buys into-however unwittingly-the misogynist myths about wo-
men's credibility, 29 plays a role in denying women access to justice. A
story about a sexual harassment case illustrates this aspect of the law
as male.
A few years ago the Washington, D.C. judicial conference in-
cluded a presentation on sexism in torts and damages. The judge or-
ganizing this panel contacted several lawyers in the hope of finding
female plaintiffs as speakers. One lawyer responded with a lengthy
letter about a client in a sex harassment case whom he had hoped
would be willing to speak, and about how his own ignorance almost
prevented him from taking her case. I quote extensively from this
letter because it provides a singular evocation of what our profession
has yet to learn about women's lives, and how that ignorance affects
our advocacy and women's access to the courts. The lawyer wrote:
I had especially hoped to obtain the assistance of one particular
former client, whose case was most enlightening to me as an attor-
ney. This lady called several times, nearly hysterical .... I tried to
avoid talking to her, because she seemed crazy. Finally, our recep-
tionist persuaded me to meet with this lady. Our initial conference
started off strangely, as the prospective client asked if I could give
her several large manilla envelopes. I did, and she placed them stra-
tegically on the leather of the chair, before sitting. She explained
that she was so upset by the events, that she would sweat profusely
whenever she thought about her case.
27. Id.
28. Being a woman, even a feminist woman, does not automatically confer knowledge. For
example, in her recent Atlantic article, "Feminism's Identity Crisis," noted feminist Wendy
Kaminer wrote, "[i]n some feminist circles ... it is heresy to suggest that being raped by your
date may not be as traumatic or terrifying as being raped by a stranger who breaks into your
bedroom in the middle of the night." THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 51, 67. Ms.
Kaminer is apparently unaware of the extensive clinical research documenting that neither the
relationship between rapist and victim nor the amount of force used to accomplish the rape is
determinative of a victim's response and recovery. Victims of nonstranger rape (the vast major-
ity of victims) often have a more difficult time recovering because the rape was accomplished by
gaining the victim's confidence, with the result that the victim's ability to trust anyone is shat-
tered. Schafran, supra note 25, at 1018-20 and cites therein.
29. Lynn Hecht Schafran, The Less Credible Sex, 24 THE JUDGES' J. 12, 16 (1985).
[Vol. 69:397
LET ME COUNT THE WAYS
When she came to my office, she was the chief telephone oper-
ator for her private employer. She claimed that the distinguished
man who headed the division in which she was employed had
harassed her repeatedly, and in most outrageous ways. For in-
stance, as she was xeroxing papers, he came up from behind and
pressed himself against her buttocks. On one occasion, he called,
said it was his birthday, and asked why she had not brought him a
card. During lunch, she bought a card and brought it over to his
office. He closed the door, grabbed her, kissed her and brought a
hand up under her blouse to touch her breasts. He would call her
up, promising "to light such a fire on her tail" that she would never
want any other man afterwards.
This lady rebuffed and resisted these advances, which occurred
in private, without suffering any consequences. But, when on one
occasion he tried to touch her while he was in the company of sev-
eral of his male assistants, she slapped his hand away. Then, all hell
broke loose. Everything she did on the job was wrong, and he de-
voted himself to breaking her spirit and making her an outcast.
As crazy as all of this sounded, I told this lady I would not
represent her until I had spoken with her psychiatrist and psycholo-
gist. The client agreed and got up to leave, but first threw away the
manilla envelopes, which were indeed soaked.
I spoke to her psychiatrist .... He told me that there was no
evidence of fabrication, and he believed her story. Her psychologist
concurred, so we plunged ahead.
The case was assigned to Judge X and full discovery was held.
Still, as of a few days before pretrial, there was no independent cor-
roboration, and my only strength was the believability of my client.
Then, an unrelated woman employed in a different area at the same
institution called and asked for an appointment. She came in, and
told her tale. It turned out that she had been harassed by the same
man, in many of the same ways. She was quite willing to be a wit-
ness, and also directed me to a third person, in yet another depart-
ment, with similar experiences at this man's hands.
Amazingly, my client and the other two ladies had all brought
their complaints to their employer's internal EEO office. When re-
quest was made to add these two witnesses at pretrial, and Judge X
discovered that defendants had known of these other complaints,
the case settled rather quickly. ...
Now the reason I have burdened you with such a long letter, is
because of my feeling that the objective at this judicial conference is
extremely important. I do not think I am any less sensitive than
most lawyers, but in this case, I was about to reject a meritorious
case, because it seemed to be too awful to believe. And, I was mis-
taking the client's desperate cries for justice, with hysteria.
I am not saying that I have learned how to do this without mak-
ing mistakes, but all of us, lawyers and judges, need to remember
that unspeakable acts are sometimes committed even by respected
1993]
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people and that the most severely injured of their victims may be
the hardest to believe.
30
This is a moving letter, and I thank the lawyer who wrote it for
his willingness to expose his own ignorance in furtherance of reform.
I consider the crucial point of his letter the phrase "[a]s crazy as all of
this sounded" (emphasis supplied) after the description of the harass-
ment this woman endured. I believe in verifying clients' allegations,
but why did he perceive this woman's story as "crazy"? It certainly
does not sound crazy to me. University of Maryland Law Professor
Robin West has written about the often strikingly different reactions
of women and men to the statistics and specifics about violence and
harassment against women. She asks, "Why is my reaction so different
[than men's]?"
I attribute it to this: my reality-both internal and external-in-
cludes that violence, the pain it causes and the fear it engenders.
Not only have I lived it (and they haven't), but I talk to women (and
they don't) and women talk to me (and not them). Like all women
I know, I hear narratives of violence which are not heard by any
man with the sometimes exception of male therapists. My male col-
leagues think my neighborhood is safe; they weren't told (I was) the
details of a recent rape. I hear about the date rapes of students... ;
my male colleagues do not .... I hear (men don't) about marital
violence.... I hear women's memories of early sexual abuse.... I
draw this simple inference: Women and men have wildly different
"ignorant" intuitions about the amount of danger, violence and fear
in women's lives because women live it and men don't and women
tell other women and not men.
31
WHAT IS TAUGHT IN THE LAW SCHOOLS?
Making women's real life experiences visible and understood as
they relate to the law means, for example, informing the profession
about the actual rates of sexual and domestic assault against women
and the fear of this pervasive violence with which women live every
day. This needs to begin in the law schools. A University of Ken-
tucky law professor 32 begins the rape section of her criminal law
course by asking each male student to tell the class what he does on a
30. Letter to a Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia concerning the 1988
Washington, D.C. Judicial Conference on Racism, Sexism and Gender Orientation in the Law
(Apr. 26, 1988) (for confidentiality reasons the names of the lawyer and the judge have been
omitted).
31. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Cri-
tique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987) (paper prepared for the Femi-
nism and Legal Theory Workshop: University of Wisconsin Law School (1986)).
32. Carolyn S. Bratt, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1965, SUNY at Al-
bany; J.D. 1974, Syracuse University.
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daily basis to protect himself from sexual assault. The response is a
puzzled silence. Then she asks the female students, each of whom has
something to say: I do not go to a certain mall because its parking lot
is badly lit. Before I get into my car I look to see if anyone is in the
back seat. I do not come to campus at times when there will not be
many people around. I sleep with my windows locked no matter what
the weather. The first time this law professor tried this teaching tech-
nique one woman said, "I don't worry about anything anymore. I
carry a loaded gun," and opened her handbag to take out a pistol.
Each year the men in the class are stunned to learn that fear of rape is
a daily reality for their female colleagues and in many ways conditions
their lives.3
3
When law professors teach this kind of material without being
fully informed themselves, the results can distort reality and mislead
students. A few years ago I learned that a lawyer teaching the law and
psychiatry course at a New York law school was telling his class that it
was a good thing if police did not arrest the batterer when they were
called to a wife beating case. I wrote to him about a study conducted
by the Police Foundation demonstrating that arrest, rather than telling
the batterer to walk around the block, is the most effective means to
reduce recidivism.34 The professor called me to say that he was not
teaching that the police should do nothing. He was teaching that they
should to take the batterer to a hospital for a shot of thorazine. When
I told him that the incidence of domestic violence is not just a few men
having psychotic episodes, but rather an epidemic of violence that
crosses all economic, racial, religious, and ethnic lines and is minimally
estimated to effect two million women every year,35 he was shocked.
Is THE LAW MALE? LET ME COUNT THE WAYS
The "Is the Law Male?" program at the 1993 American Bar As-
sociation annual meeting which produced this Symposium issue of the
Chicago-Kent Law Review addressed aspects of tort, family law and
rape and the use of expert witnesses in sexual harassment cases. The
purpose of my remarks on that occasion was to impress on our audi-
ence that, in terms of the subject matter areas where gender is an issue
33. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989).
34. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experi-
ment, POLICE FOUND. REP. (1984).
35. 1986 Bureau of Justice Statistics as cited in Women, Violence, and the Law: A Fact Sheet:
Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, House of Representatives,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1988).
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in the courts, we had barely scratched the surface, and to suggest ways
to introduce the concepts discussed at that program to judges, lawyers,
and law students who would be suspicious of something called "femi-
nist legal theory."
The reading materials distributed at the program included the ta-
ble of contents from a book I wrote in 1989 titled Promoting Gender
Fairness Through Judicial Education: A Guide to the Issues and Re-
sources. This is a 200 page guide to more than fifty substantive and
procedural areas in which gender may be a factor, and the ways that
these issues can be integrated throughout the curriculum. Given the
title of the book, it is obvious that it was written for use in developing
judicial education programs. But the title can be read as having a
double meaning. "Judicial education" is not just what goes on at the
National Judicial College or a circuit conference. Lawyers educate
judges in the course of every case. Lawyers are the essential comple-
ment to the other kind of judicial education, especially because differ-
ent judges have very different notions of what they can take judicial
notice of, and they want lawyers to bring this information into the
courts.
Promoting Gender Fairness Through Judicial Education covers
subjects ranging from abuse and neglect to trial skills, with issues such
as driving while intoxicated, medical negligence, municipal liability,
and law and psychiatry in between. Law and psychiatry, for example,
is a topic that covers a host of gender-related issues such as battered
women's syndrome, rape-related post-traumatic stress disorder, and
research showing how sex-stereotyping can color mental health pro-
fessionals' evaluations and expert witness testimony in a multitude of
legal contexts.
Blaming mothers but not fathers for children's problems is ram-
pant in the professional literature where mothers have been indicted
for seventy-two kinds of psychopathology in children ranging from
stuttering to schizophrenia. 36 Although current research demon-
strates the fallacy of blaming mothers and points to the genetic origin
of many of these problems, not all practitioners have discarded this
fallacy.
Stereotypes about women as passive and dependent can affect
mental health professionals' assessments of competency and fitness of
36. Paula J. Caplan & Ian Hall-McCorquodale, Mother Blaming in Major Clinical Journals,
55 AMER. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 345 (July 1985).
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women who are in fact assertive and independent. 37 Research indi-
cates that where gender bias exists among social workers it is nearly
always against women, and that social workers tend to adhere to tradi-
tional male and female sex roles, damning the mother or father who
does not conform to traditional sex roles in parenting or work.38
Lawyers who utilize any kind of psychological testing should be
aware of the biases there. For example, in the widely used Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, responses by women involved in
divorce proceedings or custody battles may produce results similar to
those produced by paranoid personalities. 39 There is an ongoing fight
over the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Disorders' addition of
diagnostic categories such as "Self-Defeating Personality Disorder"




As noted earlier, in addition to encouraging the audiences for its
"Is the Law Male?" programs to learn about feminist legal theory be-
cause it enhances advocacy, the ABA Commission on Women in the
Profession charges its audiences with bringing this knowledge to male
and female colleagues and encouraging them to use it. Undoubtedly,
many of you reading this Essay have just said to yourselves, "The men
I know in this profession are not going to come to a program called 'Is
the Law Male?"' And you are right. That is why, when you want to
be sure that men as well as women will attend, you should avoid
words such as male, female, gender, and feminist in the program titles,
while integrating the substantive material into continuing legal educa-
tion programs for your local and state bars, your own office if you
conduct in-house training, and any teaching you do at law schools.
The 1992 Report of the Select Committee on Gender Equality of
the Maryland Judiciary and the Maryland State Bar Association pro-
vides a model. This report states that using Promoting Gender Fair-
ness through Judicial Education, the Judicial Institute of Maryland has
included gender issues in the following list of programs:
37. BIAS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (Joan Murray & Paul R. Abramson eds., 1983).
38. Dennis M. Dailey, Are Social Workers Sexists? A Replication, 25 SOCIAL WORK 46
(1980).
39. Lynne Bravo Rosewater, The Clinical and Courtroom Application of Battered Women's
Personality Assessments, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987).
40. Joan Einwohner, Controversy Over DSM 111R Psychiatric Categories Continues to Grow
Throughout the Country, 38 THE NEW YORK STATE PSYCHOLOGIST 19 (1987); Brina Caplan,
Crazy by Definition, SAVVY, Sept. 1986, at 82.
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(1) Specialty Topics in Addiction
(2) The Right to Forego Treatment
(3) Marital Property
(4) Mental Health Issues Affecting Maryland Courts
(5) Contempt
(6) Fairness in the Courtroom
(7) Demeanor and Efficiency in the Courtroom
(8) The Use of Experts in Disputed Custody Cases
(9) Expert Testimony in Juvenile and Domestic Court
(10) Handling the Chronic Youthful Offender
(11) Emergency Ex-Parte Orders
(12) Alternative Dispute Resolution
(13) Race and the Criminal Process
(14) Employment Law41
The effectiveness of this integrated approach in attracting an au-
dience is illustrated by a story from Justice Rosalie Wahl of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, chair of the Minnesota Task Force for Gender
Fairness in the Courts. At a state-wide meeting of judges, a session on
family law was so popular that judges "were fighting to get into the
room." The session was actually the pilot test of a curriculum on
spousal and child support created by the Women Judges' Fund for
Justice.42 Afterward, Justice Wahl overheard two male judges discuss-
ing the program and saying "Well thank goodness we don't have any
of this gender stuff-gender education-this time." As Justice Wahl
said, "The funny thing is... we had a half day of it! They didn't even
recognize it! It may be that when you label it, some of them don't like
it, but they don't recognize it when they see it.
'43
Avoiding program titles with words like "gender" in them is not
cowardice. Integrating gender issues throughout legal and judicial
training under substantive law headings is the way to ensure that these
issues will not be perceived as something tangential to the real work
of the courts, to be covered grudgingly in an hour or two every five
years, but rather as part of the mainstream of the law with which
judges and lawyers must grapple every day.
41. REPORT OF THE SELECr COMMrrTEE ON GENDER EQUALITY OF THE MARYLAND JUDI-
CIARY AND THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, at 5-6 (1992).
42. The Women Judges' Fund for Justice is the 501(c)(3) educational arm of the National
Association of Women Judges.
43. As quoted in JEANNETIE F. SwENT, GENDER BIAS AT THE SEAT OF JUSTICE: AN EM-
PIRICAL STUDY OF STATE TASK FORCES (1992).
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If these issues are integrated consistently and repeatedly into ed-
ucation for law students, lawyers, and the judiciary, women's perspec-
tives will eventually become integrated into law and legal practice,
and programs titled "Is the Law Male?" will become meaningless
within a context where the diversity of human experience is fully
recognized.

